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THE CRIMINAL TRANSMISSION OF AIDS:  A CRITICAL 
EXAMINATION OF MISSOURI’S HIV-SPECIFIC STATUTE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an extraordinary criminal trial, a St. Charles County jury found Brian T. 
Stewart guilty of injecting his infant son with HIV-tainted blood.1  Now 
suffering from full-blown AIDS, the boy struggles daily to combat the effects 
of the virus.2  The child is fed mostly a liquid diet through a plastic tube 
leading directly to his stomach, and he is almost completely deaf as a result of 
the ten different disease-fighting medications he takes everyday. 3  Physicians 
do not expect him to live a “normal life span.”4 
According to authorities, Stewart injected his son with the deadly virus 
simply to avoid making child-support payments.5  To achieve a conviction, the 
prosecutor presented a case based substantially on circumstantial evidence.6  
The state argued that the defendant, a hospital phlebotomist, had easy access to 
HIV-contaminated blood and possessed the motive to commit the crime.7  
During the trial, the evidence demonstrated that Stewart often brought home 
 
 1. State v. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  See also William C. Lhotka, 
Judges Deny Retrial of Man Who Infected Son with HIV, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 
2000, at B2; Michele Munz, Father is Found Guilty of Giving His Son an HIV-Tainted Injection, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Father is Found Guilty]. 
 2. See Frank Gluck, Mom Describes Son’s Fight with AIDS, ST. CHARLES J., Dec. 6, 1998, 
at 2A; Michele Munz, Trial Hears Iffy Prognosis for Boy with AIDS, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 5, 1998, at 5 [hereinafter Trial Hears Iffy Prognosis]. 
 3. Gluck, supra note 2, at 2A. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 83. See also Michele Munz, Stewart Jury is Set for Opening 
Statements, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Stewart Jury is Set for 
Opening Statements]. 
 6. Father is Found Guilty, supra note 1, at A1. St. Charles County Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney Ross Buehler noted this case could only be argued with circumstantial evidence because 
of the defendant’s diabolical nature.  Id.  Buehler stated that “circumstantial evidence is like a 
number of strings that weave together and make a rope,” and that “it’s a very strong rope that 
bears the weight of a conviction.”  Id.  See also Stewart Jury is Set for Opening Statements, supra 
note 5, at B1. 
 7. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 81-82.  Defendant worked as a phlebotomist at Barnes-Jewish 
Hospital in St. Louis.  Id.  “His duties there were to collect blood from patients.”  Id. 
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tourniquets, needles and syringes in his lab coat.8  He also denied being the 
boy’s father, argued that he had no financial responsibility and made 
comments about the boy not living very long.9  Family members reported 
finding several vials of blood in the freezer when Stewart was living with 
them,10 and other witnesses testified that Stewart made threatening statements 
such as: “I could inject them with something and they would never know what 
hit them.”11 
The defendant allegedly infected his son with the virus when the child was 
hospitalized for an unrelated respiratory problem.12  While wearing his lab 
coat, which had deep pockets for carrying supplies, Stewart paid his son an 
unexpected visit at the hospital.13  After entering his son’s room, he placed his 
lab coat on a rocking chair.14  Referring to stitches that were on the boy’s face 
at the time, Stewart mentioned that the boy was going to be scarred for life and 
that he “was not worth having.”15  When the boy’s mother returned from the 
cafeteria, she found her son on the defendant’s lap crying hysterically.16  
Defendant’s lab coat had been suspiciously moved from the chair while the 
mother was out of the room.17  The boy’s health declined immediately after 
Stewart’s private visit.18 
Physicians could not understand the dramatic change in the child’s health.  
He exhibited difficulty breathing, a fever and a fast heart rate.19  These 
 
 8. Id.  See also Michele Munz, Stewart Threatened Their Son, Boy’s Mother Testifies Man 
Injected Child with HIV-Tainted Blood, Prosecutors Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 
1998, at A1 [hereinafter Stewart Threatened Their Son]. 
 9. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 83.  The court noted: 
Defendant said, “[Y]ou won’t need to look me up for child support anyway because your 
child is not going to live that long.”  Mother asked what Defendant meant by that and he 
replied, “[D]on’t worry about it.  I just know that he is not going to live to see the age of 
five.”  Defendant said that if Mother tried to find him he could have her taken care of and 
that nobody would be able to trace it back to him. 
Id.  See also Stewart Threatened Their Son, supra note 8, at A1. 
 10. See Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 81; Stewart Threatened Their Son, supra note 8, at A1. 
 11. See Father Is Found Guilty, supra note 1, at A1.  See also Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 83; 
Trial Hears Iffy Prognosis, supra note 2, at 5. 
 12. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 82.  “On Feb. 2, 1992, Mother brought [her son], who was eleven 
months old, to St. Joseph’s Hospital West in St. Charles County because [the child’s] asthma had 
worsened.”  Id. 
 13. Id.  See also Michele Munz, Determined Detective Tracked Boy’s HIV Two-Year 
Investigation Ended with Charges Against Father, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1998, at 
A1 [hereinafter Determined Detective]. 
 14. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 82. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  See also Determined Detective, supra note 13, at A1. 
 19. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 82. 
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symptoms, and the sudden change in the boy’s condition, were consistent with 
those of receiving incompatible blood.20  Instead of being sent home, the boy 
had to be transported to a pediatrics hospital for further treatment.21  Defendant 
never again visited his son in the hospital.22  The child was diagnosed with 
AIDS four years later.23  After the virus was finally discovered, physicians 
stated the boy was in the final stages of AIDS and characterized his prognosis 
as “very dismal.”24 
The state of Missouri and St. Louis health departments tested people with 
whom the child had contact and could not determine how the child contracted 
the disease.25  All twenty-six people tested negative for the antibodies to 
HIV.26  A two-year criminal investigation, however, implicated Stewart in the 
crime.27  He had access to HIV-tainted blood, he threatened that the boy would 
not live past the age of five and he had the motive and opportunity to commit 
the crime.28  Moreover, a witness testified that Stewart knew his son had AIDS 
before the defendant was ever officially notified.29  Based on the evidence, the 
jury convicted Stewart,30 and the court sentenced him to the maximum 
 
 20. Id.  “No reason for the victim’s sudden change of condition was discerned at that time.  
The trial testimony of Dr. Linda Steele-Greene, the victim’s physician, established that the 
victim’s symptoms were consistent with a hemolytic reaction.”  Id. at 83 n.3. 
 21. Id. The victim was transferred to Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital in St. Louis. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 83. 
 24. Gluck, supra note 2, at 2A. 
 25. Father is Found Guilty, supra note 1, at A1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Determined Detective, supra note 13, at A1. 
 28. Father is Found Guilty, supra note 1, at A1.  While the state did not have direct evidence 
in this case, Buehler, summarizing the case, argued that: 
 Stewart had access.  His job gave him the opportunity to draw blood from patients with 
AIDS.  He easily could have left the hospital with vials of blood, syringes and needles. 
 He had a motive.  Stewart would not admit he was the boy’s father and had to be ordered 
to pay child support.  He moved from one girlfriend to the next, and never wanted to leave 
any ties behind. 
 He had the opportunity.  On Feb. 6, 1992, the boy was being treated at Lake St. Louis 
hospital for respiratory problems.  The child was scheduled to be released that day but 
took a turn for the worst after a private visit by Stewart.  The symptoms he showed could 
have been from receiving incompatible blood, a blood specialist testified. 
 He had made threats.  Stewart told the boy’s mother not to bother seeking child support 
because the boy wouldn’t live past the age of 5.  Others testified he made statements, such 
as “I have the power to destroy the world” and “I would inject them with something and 
they would never know what hit them.” 
Id. 
 29. Id.  See also Trial Hears Iffy Prognosis, supra note 2, at 5. 
 30. Stewart, 18 S.W.3d at 83.  “[Stewart] was charged by information with assault in the first 
degree for attempting to kill or cause serious physical injury . . . to his biological son . . . by 
injecting him with Human Immunodeficiency Virus.”  Id. at 81. 
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punishment of life in prison.31  Under Missouri law, however, he will be 
eligible for parole in fifteen years.32 
This highly publicized trial33 demonstrated the potential of using AIDS as 
a deadly weapon.  Like many states, Missouri has a statute that makes it a 
criminal offense to intentionally expose a person to HIV.34  But this statute was 
inapplicable in the Stewart case because the statute affects only persons 
knowingly infected with the disease.35  Unlike defendants in most previous 
criminal HIV-transmission cases, Stewart was not infected with HIV.  He 
simply used the virus as a tool to carry out his assault.  As a result, the state 
could not charge him for violating this particular law.  Moreover, the statute of 
limitations under the law had expired by the time the child was diagnosed with 
the virus.36  These are just two of the reasons why Stewart could not be 
charged under Missouri’s current law.37 
While many recent law journal articles have addressed HIV-specific 
statutes,38 this Comment will particularly explore Missouri’s law.  This 
 
 31. Id.  See also Father is Found Guilty, supra note 1, at A1 (stating that the jury 
recommended life imprisonment). 
 32. Michele Munz, Stewart Gets Life Term and Verbal Pounding, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 1999, at A1.  During the sentencing hearing, St. Charles County Circuit Judge 
Ellsworth Cundiff called the life sentence far too lenient for the crime.  Id.  The judge told 
Stewart, “I cannot image anything worse.  You’ve reached new heights.  You’re in a class by 
yourself.”  Cundiff, verbally reprimanding Stewart, stated, “I believe when God finally calls you, 
you are going to burn in hell from here to eternity.  Maybe that is the only justice in this case.”  
Id. 
 33. See William C. Lhotka, Vile Nature of Alleged AIDS Crime Attracts National Media 
Attention Assault Case Against Father is Getting Gavel-to-Gavel TV Coverage, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 1998, at A1.  The nature of the crime was so vile and unusual that national 
media descended on the St. Charles County courthouse.  Id.  The national networks picked up the 
local feed from area television stations.  In addition, “Court TV has interrupted coverage of 
impeachment hearings at the nation’s Capitol to give Stewart’s trial gavel-to-gavel coverage; 
CNN had its own crew in town last week for stories on the case.”  Id.  See also Michele Munz, 
Trial for Man Accused of Infecting Son with AIDS Begins Today, Case Draws International 
Attention, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1998, at A1. 
 34. See MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
 35. Id. § 191.677(1). 
 36. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 37. For more information on the Stewart case, see The Needle and the Damage Done, ST. 
LOUIS MAG., June 2000, at 24-40. 
 38. See Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law: Statutory Issues, 
Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 47 (1993); Lori A. 
David, The Legal Ramifications in Criminal Law of Knowingly Transmitting AIDS, 19 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 259 (1995); Amy M. Decker, Criminalizing the Intentional or Reckless Exposure 
to HIV: A Wake-Up Call to Kansas, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 333 (1998); Jody B. Gabel, Liability for 
‘Knowing’ Transmission of HIV: The Evolution of a Duty to Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 981 
(1994); Jennifer Grishkin, Knowingly Exposing Another to HIV, 106 YALE L.J. 1617 (1997); 
Kimberly A. Harris, Death at First Bite: A Mens Rea Approach in Determining Criminal Liability 
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Comment will briefly discuss the history of AIDS in the United States, outline 
the U.S. government’s response to the epidemic, characterize the use of 
criminal statutes to prevent the spread of the disease, examine the history and 
enforcement of Missouri’s HIV-related statutes and point out several criticisms 
and controversies associated with the current law.  In addition, it will compare 
the statutory approach of Illinois and will suggest recommendations to the 
Missouri legislature on how it can improve the law.  The goal of this Comment 
is to encourage legislators to amend the existing law so that prosecutors can 
more readily convict people who recklessly expose others to the deadly virus. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States witnessed its first reported cases of Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”)39 in the spring of 1981.40  The first victims of 
the disease were five young, previously healthy, homosexual men living in the 
Los Angeles area.41  The disease, referred to as the “gay cancer,” was 
originally dismissed as a threat only to the homosexual community.42  This 
stereotype quickly faded, however, as the number of HIV-infected Americans 
grew and included heterosexual men and women as well.  The disease received 
 
for Intentional HIV Transmission, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1993); Donald H. J. Hermann, 
Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351 (1990); 
Jacob A. Heth, Dangerous Liaisons: Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 29 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 843 (1993); Mona Markus, A Treatment for the Disease: Criminal HIV 
Transmission/Exposure Laws, 23 NOVA L. REV. 847 (1999); Erin M. O’Toole, HIV-Specific 
Crime Legislation: Targeting an Epidemic for Criminal Prosecution, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 183 
(1996); J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 435 (1994); Thomas W. Tierney, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of 
HIV: An International Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475 (1992); Stephen V. 
Kenney, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons From History and a Model for the Future, 8 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 245 (1992). 
 39. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome has been defined as: 
The final stage of a series of specific health conditions and problems as well as 
opportunistic infections (OI) caused by a virus, HIV.  HIV can be passed from person to 
person . . . In a person who has developed AIDS, the body’s natural immune system is 
suppressed and allows for the active presence of microorganisms that otherwise would be 
fought off by the immune system.  The acronym AIDS was first used by the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) in late 1982 to name cases of illness that were first reported in 
1981. 
MARY ELLEN HOMBS, AIDS CRISIS IN AMERICA 58 (1992). See also MO. REV. STAT. § 
191.650(5) (1996). 
 40. See SETH C. KALICHMAN, UNDERSTANDING AIDS: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND 
TREATMENT 10 (2d. ed. 1998); AIDS AND THE LAW 3 (David W. Webber ed., 3rd ed. 1997). 
 41. KALICHMAN, supra note 40, at 10. 
 42. MIRKO D. GRMEK, HISTORY OF AIDS: EMERGENCE AND ORIGIN OF A MODERN 
PANDEMIC 6-9 (Russell C. Maulitz & Jacalyn Duffin trans., 1990). 
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serious public attention when AIDS cases were recorded throughout the United 
States.43 
Since its initial discovery, AIDS has continued to spread rapidly 
throughout the United States and the world.  It has been called “the most 
dramatic, pervasive and tragic pandemic in recent history.”44  Moreover, 
“AIDS [has] emerged as a global health threat faster than any previous disease 
in history.”45  According to federal estimates, an American becomes infected 
with the virus every thirteen minutes.46  All fifty states, the District of 
Columbia and U.S. dependencies and territories report diagnosed cases of 
AIDS to the federally funded Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) in 
Atlanta.47  At the end of 1999, the CDC had received a reported 733,374 
cumulative cases of AIDS in the United States.48  In addition to those who 
already have AIDS, an estimated 650,000 to 950,000 Americans are living 
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”), the retrovirus that causes 
AIDS, and approximately 40,000 new infections occur annually.49 
Clinical research has revealed valuable medical, scientific and public 
health information about HIV and AIDS.50  When HIV enters the human body, 
it attacks and damages the immune system.51  Although the virus’s damage of 
the immune system does not itself lead to death, the infection often leaves the 
victim vulnerable to other infections and malignancies.52  Many of these 
infections, often termed opportunistic infections, take advantage of the already 
weakened immune system.53  Most individuals who have full-blown AIDS die 
as a result of the complications attributed to the disease.54 
 
 43. See Virginia Shubert, Introduction to HOMBS, supra note 39, at 2-3. 
 44. GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME: BIOLOGICAL, 
MEDICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES xxi (2d ed. 1993). 
 45. KALICHMAN, supra note 40, at 57. 
 46. Dee Wampler, Felonious Assault by the HIV-AIDS Infected, 54 J. MO. B. 31, 31 (1998). 
 47. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 40, at 13; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 11 HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2, 41-
44 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasrlink.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2000) 
[hereinafter SURVEILLANCE REPORT]. 
 48. SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 5. 
 49. AIDS PROJECT LOS ANGELES, HIV/AIDS STATISTICS 8, available at 
http://www.apla.org/apla/ed/HIVSTATS.HTM (last visited Oct. 30, 2000). 
 50. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts.htm (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2000) [hereinafter HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION]. 
 51. MARK BLUMBERG, AIDS: THE IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1990). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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The paths in which HIV can be transmitted have been clearly identified.55  
The virus is spread by sexual contact with an infected individual, by sharing 
needles and syringes with someone who is infected, and less commonly, 
through transfusions of infected blood or blood clotting factors.56  In countries 
where blood is screened for HIV antibodies, cases of transfusions of infected 
blood are indeed rare.57  “Babies born to HIV-infected women may become 
infected before or during birth or through breast-feeding after birth.”58  Some 
people fear that HIV might be transmitted through other media, such as air, 
water or insects, but no scientific evidence has been discovered to support any 
of these fears.59  Despite a national reporting system designed to detect such a 
discovery, no additional routes of transmission have been recorded.60  “All 
reported cases suggesting new or potentially unknown routes of transmission 
are thoroughly investigated by state and local health departments with the 
assistance, guidance and laboratory support from [the] CDC.”61 
One of the difficult aspects of AIDS for epidemiological study is the long 
incubation period of the disease—the period between infection and the 
appearance of symptoms.62  The HIV disease can be separated into three 
stages: (1) the early short-term or acute stage that may last weeks; (2) the 
middle or chronic/latent stage that may last many years; and (3) the crisis or 
AIDS stage.63  The progression of HIV infection to full-blown AIDS varies 
according to the individual.  While some experience the progression rather 
quickly, others may not be diagnosed for ten or more years.64  The temporal 
difference in experiencing AIDS may be attributed to the strength of the 
human immune system and how successfully it can fight the virus.65  
Regardless of the length of the progression period, most HIV-infected 
individuals will eventually develop AIDS.66 
Many Americans still remain fearful of becoming infected with the virus.  
This fear is exacerbated by the deadly nature of AIDS and the social stigma 
 
 55. See AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 40, at 14-15; AIDS LAW TODAY 23-29 (Scott 
Burris et al. eds., 1993); AIDS SOURCEBOOK 11-15 (Karen Bellenir ed., 1999); BLUMBERG, 
supra note 51, at 18-29; HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION, supra note 50, at 1-4; GRMEK, supra note 
42, at 87-90; KALICHMAN, supra note 40, at 23-31; Shubert, Introduction to HOMBS, supra note 
39, at 6-8. 
 56. HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION, supra note 50, at 1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. HIV AND ITS TRANSMISSION, supra note 50, at 1. 
 62. STINE, supra note 44, at 97. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 99. 
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attached to victims of the disease.  And since there is no vaccination67 or cure 
to prevent HIV infection, it is unlikely that the incidence of the disease will 
diminish in the near future.  AIDS has clearly made a significant impact on 
society, and “perhaps more than any other illness [it] has profoundly affected 
the way in which medical, legal, public health, and information services are 
provided.”68  It was only a question of time before the government addressed 
the growing public concern about this disease. 
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO AIDS 
In response to the epidemic, the U.S. government has taken a reactive role 
in the fight to suppress the diffusion of AIDS.  While there had been much 
study of AIDS, there had been little federal action.69  It took Congress nearly a 
decade to pass legislation directed at providing care for persons with HIV and 
AIDS.  In 1988, the Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic investigated the disease and presented its 
findings in a comprehensive report.70  In this report, the commission 
recommended a national strategy to combat the spread of HIV.71  This strategy 
included proposals and means to increase the country’s efforts to discover a 
cure.  To protect the public from contracting the disease, the commission 
suggested that states and local governments advocate the use of HIV testing 
and counseling.72 
The report also endorsed the criminalization of acts that risk the 
transmission of HIV to another person.73  The report pointed out that problems 
applying traditional criminal law to HIV transmission should lead to the 
adoption of criminal statutes specific to HIV infection.74  These statutes would 
 
 67. BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 3. 
 68. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 40, at 2. 
 69. Shubert, Introduction to HOMBS, supra note 39, at 13. 
 70. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY 
VIRUS EPIDEMIC (June 1988) [hereinafter THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION].  
President Reagan appointed the Commission in May 1987. 
 71. Id. at 157-58. 
 72. Id. at 73-75. 
The recommendations of the Commission seek to strike a proper balance between our 
obligation as a society toward those members of society who have HIV and those 
members who do not have the virus.  To slow or stop the spread of the virus, to provide 
proper medical care for those who have contracted the virus, and to protect the rights of 
both infected and non-infected persons requires a careful balancing of interests in a highly 
complex society. 
Id. at XVII. 
 73. Id. at 130. 
 74. Id. The Commission pointed out the problems of prosecution under traditional criminal 
law statutes and recommended the enactment of AIDS-specific statutes that prosecute individuals 
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provide clear and adequate notice of socially unacceptable behavior.75  The 
report recommended that states review their criminal codes to determine the 
possible need for adopting an HIV-specific criminal statute.76  Within a year of 
the commission’s report, all fifty states had enacted some form of AIDS 
legislation addressing health educational programs, reporting and testing for 
the virus.77  Some states even heeded the advice of the report and passed HIV-
specific statutes.78 
Congress addressed the growing epidemic by passing The Ryan White 
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (“CARE”) Act of 1990.79  This 
Act was dedicated to the memory of the 70,000 persons who lost their lives to 
AIDS as of the date of the law’s enactment and to the memory of Ryan 
White.80  While the measure was initially authorized for only five years, it was 
amended and extended for another five years in 1996.81  The CARE Act 
provides emergency relief by funding prevention, health services and health 
 
who “knowingly conduct themselves in ways that pose a significant risk of transmission to 
others . . . .”  Id.  In its report, the Commission recommended: 
Adoption by the states of a criminal statute—directed to those HIV-infected individuals 
who know of their status and engage in behaviors which they know are, according to 
scientific research, likely to result in transmission of HIV—clearly setting forth those 
specific behaviors subject to criminal sanctions.  With regard to sexual transmission, the 
statute should impose on HIV-infected individuals who know of their status specific 
affirmative duties to disclose their condition to sexual partners, to obtain their partner’s 
knowing consent, and to use precautions, punishing only for failure to comply with these 
affirmative duties. 
 
HIV criminal statutes should include strong, uniform confidentiality protection. 
Id. at 131. 
 75. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 70, at 130. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kenney, supra note 38, at 260. 
 78. See infra note 140. 
 79. Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-146, 110 Stat. 1346 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The purpose of the Act is to: 
[P]rovide emergency assistance to localities that are disproportionately affected by the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus epidemic and to make financial assistance available to 
States and other public or private nonprofit entities to provide for the development, 
organization, coordination and operation for more effective and cost efficient systems for 
the delivery of essential services to individuals and families with HIV disease. 
42 U.S.C. § 300ff (1994). 
 80. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
381, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 862, 862-63.  Ryan White helped bring AIDS awareness to 
the public eye by winning a court battle to attend school in Indiana.  He died in 1990 at age 
eighteen. 
 81. Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-146, 110 Stat. 1346 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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care to the communities hardest hit by the AIDS epidemic.82  It also conditions 
the granting of emergency AIDS relief to states that demonstrate the capability 
of effectively prosecuting HIV-infected individuals who intentionally or 
knowingly expose others to the virus through sexual contact, blood or tissue 
donations or sharing hypodermic needles.83 
The law had its desired effect on state legislatures.  Passage of the CARE 
Act prompted many states to enact laws to criminally punish individuals who 
knowingly transmit or expose others to the virus.84  These criminal laws 
provide a means to educate and reinforce the norms of society.  States had 
three basic alternatives to satisfy the CARE Act’s prosecution requirement: (1) 
a state could modify existing public health statutes that criminalize the 
transmission and exposure of specified communicable diseases to include HIV; 
(2) a state could rely on traditional criminal statutes to combat the transmission 
of the virus; or (3) a state could enact an HIV-specific statute.85  This 
Comment will look exclusively on the latter two alternatives. 
A. Traditional Criminal Laws 
States initially prosecuted defendants who knowingly transmitted HIV 
exclusively under traditional criminal offenses.86  These traditional offenses 
were readily available to prosecutors and advanced the criminal law objective 
of deterrence.  Many of these prosecutions involved HIV-positive individuals 
who knew of their infections and assaulted other persons, usually police 
officers or prison guards.87  While states have charged alleged offenders with 
manslaughter, negligent homicide and reckless endangerment, they more 
 
 82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff(11),(14) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 83. Id. § 300ff(47).  The Act states: 
The Secretary may not make a grant under section 300ff-41 of this Title to a State unless 
the chief executive officer determines that the criminal laws of the State are adequate to 
prosecute any HIV infected individual, subject to the condition described in subsection (b) 
of this section, who— 
(1)  makes a donation of blood, semen, or breast milk, if the individual knows that he or 
she infected with HIV and intends, through such donation, to expose another to HIV in 
the event that the donation is utilized; 
(2)  engages in sexual activity if the individual knows that he or she is infected with HIV 
a intends, through such sexual activity, to expose another to HIV; and 
(3)  injects himself or herself with a hypodermic needle and subsequently provides the 
needle to another person for purposes of hypodermic injection, if the individual knows 
that he or she is infected and intends, through the provision of the needle, to expose 
another to such etiologic agent in the event that the needle is utilized. 
Id. 
 84. See Heth, supra note 38, at 845; Kenney, supra note 38, at 247. 
 85. Heth, supra note 38, at 845. 
 86. Prosecutors most often charged attempted murder and assault.  Strader, supra note 38, at 
437. 
 87. AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 55, at 245. 
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commonly prosecute under the traditional crimes of murder, attempted murder 
and aggravated assault.88 
Murder 
Compared to other traditional criminal laws, murder is considered “the 
most serious criminal offense with which a person can be charged for 
transmitting HIV.”89  Since criminal laws in the United States are primarily 
enacted and enforced on the state and local level, the definitions of murder 
vary according to jurisdictions.90  Most states, however, have revised their 
criminal codes in recent years, guided by the Model Penal Code (“the 
Code”).91  To obtain a murder conviction in most jurisdictions, the state must 
prove four elements: (1) some conduct, whether an affirmative act or an 
omission to act where there is a duty to act, on the part of the defendant; (2) an 
accompanying “malicious” mental state; (3) defendant’s conduct “legally 
caused” the death of the victim; and (4) in some jurisdictions, the death must 
occur within a year and a day after the defendant’s conduct.92 
The state must first demonstrate that the defendant acted or failed to act in 
some way.  In HIV-transmission cases, the infected defendant may have 
engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse, donated blood to the American Red 
Cross, shared a contaminated hypodermic needle or bit a prison guard.  To 
satisfy the first element, the state need only prove that the defendant 
participated in such conduct.  The state then has to demonstrate that the 
defendant had the requisite mental state.  As distinguished from manslaughter, 
murder requires a higher culpable state of mind.93  According to the Code, 
murder is the killing of another human being either purposely or knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting “extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.”94 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Tierney, supra note 38, at 491. 
 90. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 40, at 266. 
 91. BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 112. 
 92. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 660 (3rd ed. 2000). 
 93. BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 113. 
 94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Official Draft 1962) defines murder as: 
(1)  Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder 
when: 
(a)  it is committed purposely or knowingly; or 
(b)  it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life.  Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the 
actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual 
intercourse by force or by threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious 
escape. 
(2)  Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be 
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Each type of culpability has been defined accordingly.  The Code defines 
“purposely” as wanting the prohibited result.95  To prove purpose state of 
mind, the state must demonstrate that the defendant was aware of his HIV-
positive status, that he believed that the virus could be transmitted by the 
activity and that he sought the death of the person by engaging in this 
behavior.96  The term “knowing” is defined as being consciously aware that the 
result will occur.97  To prove a knowing state of mind, the state must prove that 
the defendant was aware that he carried HIV and that he was practically certain 
that his activity would transmit the virus to another person.98  The term 
“reckless” is defined as being consciously aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur.99  To prove a reckless state of mind, 
the state must establish that the defendant acted in conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was HIV infected, that he could 
transmit the virus and that transmission would cause the death of another 
person.100  In addition, a reckless state of mind must be committed under 
conditions exhibiting extreme indifference to human life.101 
The state must conclusively show that the defendant knew of his HIV 
status and that he purposely, knowingly or recklessly spread the virus to 
another person.  In reality, however, an “AIDS transmitter is rarely certain that 
an act transmits AIDS, as knowing murder requires.”102  The intent element 
 
sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6.]. 
 95. Id. § 2.02(2)(a) defines purposely as: 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i)  if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and 
(ii)  if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence 
of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 
 96. See BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 113; David, supra note 38, at 262. 
 97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) defines knowingly as: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i)  if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he 
is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii)  if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically 
certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
 98. See BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 113; David, supra note 38, at 263. 
 99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) defines recklessly as: 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material offense exists 
or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of a nature and degree that, considering 
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
 100. See BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 113; David, supra note 38, at 263. 
 101. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b); David, supra note 38, at 263. 
 102. Harris, supra note 38, at 244. 
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may not be present in many prosecutions, as the goal of the defendant may not 
be the spread of the virus, but simply to have sexual relations.  Even where the 
defendant did plan or hope to spread the virus, it is almost impossible to prove 
intent absent an admission of the defendant.103 
Even if the requisite state of mind element is satisfied, the state then has 
the burden of demonstrating the element of legal causation.104  The state must 
show that the victim acquired the infection because of the acts or omissions of 
the defendant.105  Establishing causation may be the most difficult challenge in 
proving charges for HIV-transmission.  If the victim had many sexual partners, 
causation may be difficult to prove because it would be possible that more than 
one of these partners had HIV.  If this were indeed the case, it would be 
virtually impossible to determine which sexual partner transmitted the disease 
to the victim.106  In addition, the long period of time between exposure and 
detection exacerbates the problem.  It could take years for a victim to 
demonstrate symptoms of HIV.  Unless the victim undergoes an HIV test 
before this time, she will not know that she was exposed to the virus until long 
after the criminal act has taken place. 
Finally, murder statutes require the death of the victim.107  Since death may 
not occur for a considerable amount of time after transmission, the defendant 
may often die before the victim.108  Under these circumstances, a charge of 
murder is moot.  In addition, valuable evidence may be destroyed or lost 
between the time of transmission of the virus and the death of the victim.  
Another impediment involves the “year and a day” rule for homicide.109  This 
“rule provides that death cannot be attributed to the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct unless it occurs within a year and a day of the conduct.”110  Since the 
victim’s death may not come about for years after the transmission, the state 
would be prohibited from pursuing this cause of action under those 
circumstances. 
In light of the many problems associated with proving murder, such as 
state of mind, causation, and the death of the victim, most murder prosecutions 
of persons accused of engaging in HIV-transmitting behavior will likely be 
ineffective.  Nonetheless, prosecutors still have the discretion of using the 
murder statute to punish individuals who spread HIV.  They simply have the 
challenging burden of satisfying all the necessary elements. 
 
 103. Decker, supra note 38, at 341. 
 104. Tierney, supra note 38, at 493. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Decker, supra note 38, at 340. 
 107. Tierney, supra note 38, at 492. 
 108. Id. 
 109. LAFAVE, supra note 92, at 660; David, supra note 38, at 263. 
 110. David, supra note 38, at 263. 
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Attempted Murder 
Some prosecutors have charged those who intentionally transmit the virus 
with the crime of attempted murder.111  In some ways, attempted murder is 
much easier to prove than murder.  Unlike in murder cases, in an attempted 
murder trial the state is not required to meet the difficult burden of proving 
causation.112  Attempted murder also does not require the state to prove the 
death of the victim, the cause of death or the actual transmission of the virus.113  
The charge would apply not only when the victim has not yet died of AIDS, 
but even when the victim does not become infected with the disease at all. 
Under the Code, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with 
the purpose of causing the death or with the belief that death would result.114  
For the defendant to be found guilty, the state must show that he had either the 
goal of infecting another individual or the knowledge that the infection would 
in fact occur.  As long as the defendant infected with AIDS “engaged in 
conduct that could transmit the virus and did so with the requisite state of 
mind,” he could be found guilty of attempted murder.115 
The primary challenge with this offense, however, is proving the element 
of intent.116  The prosecution, attempting to demonstrate attempted murder, 
must establish that the defendant acted with the intent or purpose to cause the 
death of the victim.117  This is again a difficult task to accomplish.  The intent 
to kill must be “more than a mere tenuous, theoretical, or speculative chance of 
transmitting the disease.”118  It is unlikely that the defendant will admit his 
intention to kill by infecting people with HIV.119  Many of the cases that have 
been successfully prosecuted under the attempted murder statute, however, 
 
 111. Id. at 264. 
 112. Tierney, supra note 38, at 496. 
 113. Id. 
 114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) defines attempt as: 
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: 
(a)  purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to be; or 
(b)  when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result 
without further conduct on his part; or 
(c)  purposely does not omit to do anything which, under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of 
conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 
 115. BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 116. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Wampler, supra note 46, at 31 (quoting State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
 119. Decker, supra note 38, at 347. 
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have involved defendants who made their intentions known to someone before 
committing their crime.120  Prosecutors often have to point to extrinsic 
evidence of the defendant’s intent to kill.  Sometimes this evidence simply 
does not exist. 
Assault 
Assault can also be used for prosecuting HIV-transmission offenses.121  
Assault may seem a more appropriate tool for reaching AIDS transmission 
than murder or attempted murder.122  In assault cases, for instance, proof of 
death of the victim and actual transmission of the virus may not be required.123  
Assault may therefore be a more successful alternative for prosecuting HIV 
transmission.124  On the other hand, as in murder cases, the state must prove in 
assault prosecutions the elements of intent and causation. 125 
A person commits simple assault under the Code if he “attempts to cause 
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another” or 
“negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon.”126  A 
person commits aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life” or “attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to 
another with a deadly weapon.”127  The Code states that simple assault is a 
felony of the third-degree while an aggravated assault is a felony of the second 
degree.128  While most state criminal codes have varying degrees of assault, 
prosecutors often apply the most serious one for cases involving a defendant 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. BLUMBERG, supra note 51, at 117. 
 122. David, supra note 38, at 266. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) defines simple assault as: 
A person is guilty of assault if he: 
(a)  attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b)  negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or 
(c)  attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury. 
 127. Id. § 211.1(2) defines aggravated assault as: 
A person commits aggravated assault if he 
(a)  attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life; or 
(b)  attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with 
a deadly weapon. 
 128. Id. § 211.1. 
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who knowingly transmits HIV.129  The prosecution in the Stewart case, for 
example, charged the defendant with assault in the first degree.130 
The Code also provides for consent as a defense to assault.131  Consent of 
the victim is relevant in assault cases involving HIV transmission.  Under the 
common law, consent is a complete defense because it vitiates the element of 
offensiveness.132  In the Code, on the other hand, consent is a defense in some 
cases, but not in cases of serious bodily harm.133  In the context of HIV 
transmission, only informed consent will suffice.134  Consent to sexual activity 
does not constitute consent to contract AIDS.  For consent to preclude a 
prosecution under aggravated assault, the victim must agree to sexual 
intercourse with the defendant knowing that he has AIDS or tested positive for 
HIV exposure.135 
B. AIDS Specific Statutes 
In addition to the CARE Act’s financial incentives,136 the challenges of 
using traditional criminal laws have encouraged state legislators to enact HIV-
specific statutes.  These statutes are consistent with the Report of the 
Presidential Commission, which recognized the problems in applying 
traditional criminal laws to HIV transmission.137  According to the report, 
“[j]ust as other individuals in society are held responsible for their actions 
outside the criminal law’s established parameters of acceptable behavior, HIV-
infected individuals who knowingly conduct themselves in ways that pose a 
significant risk of transmission to others must be held accountable for their 
actions.”138  An HIV-specific statute can provide clear notice of socially 
unacceptable standards of behavior and facilitate tailoring punishment to the 
specific crime of HIV-transmitting behavior.139 
The majority of states have enacted statutes criminalizing activity that 
exposes others to HIV or other communicable diseases.140  These statutes were 
 
 129. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 40, at 273 (noting that “some states have aggravated 
sexual assault statutes which apply to sexual assaults in which the accused causes or attempts to 
cause serious bodily injury or death”). 
 130. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 131. Tierney, supra note 38, at 498. 
 132. Harris, supra note 38, at 247-48. 
 133. Tierney, supra note 38, at 498. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff(47) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 137. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 70, at 130. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. States that have enacted HIV-specific legislation include the following: 
Arkansas: Exposing another person to HIV is a class A felony.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 
(Michie 1997). 
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California: Donating blood, tissue or body organ after knowledge of HIV infection is a felony.  
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000). 
Colorado: Authorizing the department of health to restrict dangerous conduct by an HIV-positive 
person.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1406 (2000). 
Delaware: Authorizing the department of health to restrict dangerous conduct by an HIV-positive 
person.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 704 (1995). 
Florida: Engaging in sexual intercourse after knowledge of HIV infection without informed 
consent is illegal.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 1998).  Criminal transmission of HIV is a 
felony of the third degree.  Id. § 775.0877(3) (2000).  Prostituting or offering to commit 
prostitution after knowledge of HIV infection is a felony of the third degree.  Id. § 796.08(5) 
(2000). 
Georgia: Prostituting, needle sharing, engaging in oral or anal sex or donating blood/blood 
products after knowledge of HIV infection and without disclosure is a felony and punishable by 
imprisonment of not more than ten years.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (1999). 
Idaho: Exposing another person to AIDS or HIV by transferring or attempting to transfer body 
fluid, blood or tissue is a felony and punishable by imprisonment of not more than fifteen years.  
IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Michie 1998). 
Illinois: Engaging in intimate contact, donating blood or transferring needles after knowledge of 
HIV infection and without disclosure and consent is a class 2 felony.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/12-16.2 (West 1993). 
Indiana: Intentionally donating, selling or transferring blood or semen that contains HIV is a class 
C felony.  It is a class A felony if the act results in the transmission of HIV to any other person 
than the defendant.  IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (Michie 1998). 
Kansas: Exposing another person to a life-threatening communicable disease is a level 7 felony.  
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3435 (Supp. 1999). 
Kentucky: Donating organs, skin or other tissue after knowledge of HIV infection is a class D 
felony.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.452(3)(d) (Michie 1998). 
Louisiana: Intentionally exposing another person to HIV through sexual contact or any means 
without informed consent is a felony and punishable of imprisonment of no more than ten years.  
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1997). 
Maryland: Exposing another person to an infectious disease is a misdemeanor.  MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601 (2000). 
Michigan: Transferring or attempting to transfer HIV sexually to another person after knowledge 
of HIV infection is a felony.  MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(5210) (Michie 1995). 
Montana: Knowingly exposing another person to a sexually transmitted disease, including AIDS, 
is a misdemeanor.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-112, 50-18-113 (1999). 
Nevada: Intentionally or knowingly engaging in conduct intended to or likely to transmit HIV 
after knowledge of HIV infection is a class B felony.  NEV. REV. STAT. 201.205 (1997). 
New Jersey: Exposing another person to sexual penetration after knowledge of HIV infection 
without informed consent is a crime of the third degree.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (West 
1997). 
North Dakota: Willfully transferring bodily fluid after knowledge of HIV infection is a class A 
felony.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997). 
Ohio: Failing to take reasonable measures to prevent others’ exposure to a contagious disease is 
illegal.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.81 (West 1998).  Selling or donating HIV-infected blood 
is a felony of the fourth degree.  Id. § 2927.13. 
Oklahoma: Knowingly engaging in conduct reasonably likely to transfer HIV, without informed 
consent, is a felony and punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years.  OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West Supp. 2000). 
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drafted to circumvent the inadequacies of the traditional criminal laws.  While 
the proposed and enacted HIV-specific statutes vary from state to state, all of 
these laws make it an offense for an HIV-infected person to knowingly engage 
in behavior likely to transmit the virus.  In their broadest form, these statutes 
criminalize any knowingly conducted activity that poses a risk of HIV 
transmission.141  HIV-specific statutes are preferable in that they make 
prosecution easier and more successful, they offer better protection to society 
from individuals who transmit HIV and they are fairer to the criminal 
defendant.142  These statutes provide clearer warnings and notice regarding 
what constitutes a crime.143 
Many problems associated with the use of the general criminal laws are 
effectively avoided.  A properly drafted statute avoids the problems of proving 
the state of mind of intent and the element of causation, which are required by 
most traditional criminal statutes.144  Most HIV-specific statutes do not require 
the element of intent.  The state does not need to demonstrate, for example, 
that the infected person intended to physically harm his victim.145  This 
significantly benefits the prosecution, for it is unlikely that the HIV-infected 
individual engaged in some activity with the sole intent to do harm.146  This 
element is often difficult to prove at trial.  In addition, there is no need to prove 
that the victim contracted the virus from the defendant.147  Two reasons exist 
for not requiring the causation element.148  Since the chances of contracting the 
virus from a single act of unprotected sex with an HIV-infected person are 
small, it is unlikely that the defendant will actually transmit the virus.  
Moreover, if the victim does contract the virus, proving that it was contracted 
 
South Carolina: Knowingly exposing another to HIV through sexual activity, blood donation or 
needle exchange without informed consent is a felony and punishable by imprisonment of not 
more than ten years.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. 1999). 
Tennessee: Engaging in intimate contact, transferring blood/blood products or exchanging or 
transferring needles after knowledge of HIV infection is a class C felony.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-13-109 (1997). 
Utah: Willfully introducing a communicable disease into the community is a class A 
misdemeanor.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1998). 
Virginia: Donating or selling blood, organs, body fluids or tissue after knowledge of HIV 
infection is a class 6 felony.  VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.2 (Michie 1997). 
West Virginia: Exposing another person to an infectious venereal disease is illegal.  W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-4-20 (Michie 1998). 
 141. Kenney, supra note 38, at 268. 
 142. Markus, supra note 38, at 871. 
 143. Id. at 872. 
 144. Id. at 871. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 872. 
 147. Markus, supra note 38, at 871. 
 148. Id. 
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from the defendant is problematic.  To avoid these problems, most HIV-
specific statutes do not require the state to prove causation.149 
There are two common kinds of HIV-specific statutes.150  The first type 
imposes penalties on persons who donate blood, body fluids or body parts 
knowing that they are HIV-infected or that they tested positive for HIV 
antibodies.151  The second type imposes penalties on persons who engage in 
sexual intercourse or penetration of another person knowing that they are HIV-
infected.152  Some states, like Missouri, incorporate the language of both kinds 
into one statute.153  Regardless, these statutes are designed to set forth 
prohibited behavior and attempt to make it clear to offenders that risky conduct 
will not be tolerated. 
In order for a state to prosecute an alleged offender with an HIV-specific 
statute, the person must have engaged in a sexual or other prohibited activity 
articulated by the law.154  The state must also demonstrate that the defendant 
knew of his HIV-positive status at the time of the alleged misconduct.155  
There are two potential objections to this requirement.  First, it may encourage 
individuals to forego testing in order to remain ignorant of their HIV status, 
thus never achieving the “knowing state of mind” requirement.156  Second, it 
may be difficult to prove that the defendant had knowledge of his HIV status 
because he may have been tested anonymously or not tested at all.157  These 
criticisms have been applied to Missouri’s current law and will be discussed 
more in this Comment. 
IV. MISSOURI’S LEGAL APPROACH 
The Missouri General Assembly enacted a law in 1988 that made it a crime 
for a person to create deliberately a “grave and unjustifiable risk” of infecting 
another with HIV through sexual or other contact.158  This statute, however, 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 863. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Markus, supra note 38, at 863. 
 153. See MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677. 
 154. Markus, supra note 38, at 863. 
 155. Id. at 863, 873. 
 156. Id. at 873. 
 157. Id. 
 158. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (1996) states: 
1.  It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to: 
(1)  Be or attempt to be a blood, organ, sperm or tissue donor except as deemed 
necessary for medical research; or 
(2)  Deliberately create a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV 
through sexual or other contact when an individual knows that he is creating that risk. 
2.  Violation of the provisions of subsection 1 of this section is a class D felony. 
3.  The department of health may file a complaint with the prosecuting attorney of a court 
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proved ineffective at curbing the transmission of the virus.  It is estimated that 
only sixteen people were ever charged in Missouri circuit courts under this law 
over an eight-year period.159  One explanation for so few prosecutions was that 
the statute demanded that prosecutors satisfy the element of criminal intent.160  
Moreover, the statute authorized only the Missouri Department of Health 
(“DOH”) to file complaints of violations of this law to the county prosecutor. 
In response to some high-profile HIV-transmission cases in the St. Louis 
metropolitan area, the legislature amended the existing law in 1997 to make it 
easier for prosecutors to bring offenders to justice.161  The new statute was 
designed to better assist the health and criminal justice communities in their 
fight to remove from the streets persons who knowingly transmit HIV.  Like 
the previous statute, the new law applies only to individuals knowingly 
infected with HIV, specifically classifies the activities that are considered 
 
of competent jurisdiction alleging that an individual has violated a provision of subsection 
1 of this section.  The department of health shall assist the prosecutor in preparing such 
case. 
 159. Kim Bell, Law Aims to Curb AIDS Crimes: People Who Infect Others Face Easier Path 
to Prison, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 2, 1997, at A1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (1996 & Supp. 2001).  This amended statute states: 
1.  It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to: 
(1)  Be or attempt to be a blood, blood products, organ, sperm or tissue donor except 
as deemed necessary for medical research; or 
(2)  Act in a reckless manner by exposing another person to HIV without the 
knowledge and consent of that person to be exposed to HIV, through contact with 
blood, semen or vaginal fluid in the course of oral, anal or vaginal sexual intercourse, 
or by the sharing of needles.  Evidence that a person has acted recklessly in creating a 
risk of infecting another individual with HIV shall include, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
(a)  The HIV infected person knew of such infection before engaging in sexual 
activity with another person, and such other person is unaware of the HIV infected 
person’s condition or does not consent to contact with blood, semen or vaginal 
fluid in the course of sexual activity, or by the sharing of needles; 
(b)  The HIV infected person has subsequently been infected with and tested 
positive to primary and secondary syphilis, or gonorrhea, or chlamydia; or 
(c)  Another person provides corroborated evidence of sexual contact with the 
HIV infected person after a diagnosis of an HIV status. 
2.  Violation of the provisions of subsection 1 of this section is a class D felony. 
3.  Violation of the provisions of subsection 1 of this section with a person under the age 
of seventeen is a class C felony if the actor is over the age of twenty-one. 
4.  The department of health or local law enforcement agency, victim or others may file a 
complaint with the prosecuting attorney of a court of competent jurisdiction alleging that 
an individual has violated a provision of subsection 1 of this section.  The department of 
health shall assist the prosecutor in preparing such case. 
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unlawful, provides punishments for statutory violations and outlines who may 
file a complaint with the prosecutor.162 
The amended HIV-exposure law, however, can be distinguished from the 
previous law in several respects.163  First, the required mental element of 
culpability for the crime has been lessened from intentional or knowing to 
reckless.164  Prosecutors are no longer required to prove that a person 
“deliberately and knowingly created a risk of HIV infection through sexual or 
other contact.  Instead, an individual who knows that he is HIV positive need 
only to have acted recklessly in creating a risk of HIV infection.”165  This 
revision abates the burden that the state must ordinarily prove.  Second, the 
new law specifies acts that are considered evidence of reckless acts that risk 
transmitting HIV.166  The most notable of these specified acts is proof of 
infection of one of three sexually transmitted diseases after testing HIV 
positive.167  This is clear evidence of reckless acts risking HIV infection and 
alerts health officials. 
Third, a person’s informed consent to be exposed to HIV now appears to 
be an affirmative defense.168  The old law does not appear to provide an 
affirmative defense of informed consent for the crime.  This change affords 
defendants who informed their partners the opportunity to defend themselves 
against accusations.  Fourth, “the new law substantially expands the group that 
can file complaints of violations of the law with the [prosecutor].  While the 
previous law required [only the DOH to] file such a complaint, the new law 
permits a victim, a local law enforcement agency or others to do so.”169  
Finally, the new law increases the punishment for a convicted offender over 
the age of twenty-one, if his victim is under the age of seventeen.170  Under 
 
 162. See generally id. 
 163. For a comparison of the original and amended statute, see Amy E. Marchant, The “Boss 
Man” McGee Story and Missouri’s New HIV Exposure Law (1998) (unpublished law review 
article, Washington University School of Law) (on file with author). 
 164. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677.1(2). 
 165. Marchant, supra note 163, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 166. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677.1(2). 
 167. Id. § 191.677.1(2)(b) (noting “[t]he HIV infected person has subsequently been infected 
with and tested positive to primary and secondary syphilis, or gonorrhea, or chlamydia”). 
 168. Id. (noting that “[i]t shall be unlawful . . . to [a]ct in a reckless manner . . . without the 
knowledge and consent of that person to be exposed to HIV”).  But see Survey: Many with HIV 
Do Not Tell Sex Partners, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 9, 1998, at A5.  See also Marchant, 
supra note 163, at 3. 
 169. Marchant, supra note 163, at 3; MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677.4 (noting that “[t]he 
department of health or local law enforcement agency, victim or others may file a complaint with 
the prosecuting attorney of a court of competent jurisdiction alleging that an individual has 
violated a provision of subsection 1 of this section”). 
 170. Id. § 191.677.3. 
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these circumstances, this violation enhances the punishment from a class D to a 
class C felony.171 
The change in the law was reportedly prompted by a case in St. Louis 
regarding the activities of Darnell “Boss Man” McGee.172  Health officials had 
discovered that McGee, who was HIV positive, had sexual intercourse with 
more than 100 women and girls, some as young as twelve years of age.173  It is 
alleged that he infected at least thirty people with the virus, and at least one of 
his victims delivered an HIV-infected baby.174  Missouri and Illinois health 
officials claimed that McGee preyed mostly on poor teenage girls from across 
the metropolitan area, especially from St. Louis and East St. Louis.175  But 
before he could be brought to trial on charges of infecting these girls with HIV, 
McGee was murdered in alleged retaliation.176 
Health officials report that dozens of sexual predators like McGee lurk in 
the St. Louis area and elsewhere in the country, recklessly willing to expose 
their sexual partners to the virus that causes AIDS.177  This case, and another 
one bearing similar characteristics,178 apparently acted as a catalyst in causing 
the statute to be amended.  Although the statute was introduced before the 
McGee story was exposed, the passage of new HIV-exposure law was 
attributed to the media exposure concerning the case.  State officials and 
legislators indicated that the new amendments were a legislative response to 
McGee’s actions.179 
Advocates of the new law argued that Missouri’s old law relied too heavily 
on the testimony of victims and was virtually unenforceable for nine years.180  
According to the state’s Bureau of HIV Prevention, by the time the case would 
be up for prosecution, the victim would often be dead or too sick to testify as a 
result of AIDS.181  In addition, many victims would refuse to testify because 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Bell, supra note 159, at A1.  Senator J.B. “Jet” Banks of St. Louis sponsored the 
measure to crack down on people like McGee.  Id. 
 173. Id.  See also Kristina Sauerwein, A Sweet-Talking Guy Who Left a Trail of Tears and 
AIDS, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 1997, at B1. 
 174. Kristina Sauerwein & Bill Bryan, Boss Man’s Sex Partners Now Grow to Over 100, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1997, at 1A. 
 175. Kristina Sauerwein, Some HIV Carriers Don’t Care Who They Have Sex with, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Some HIV Carriers Don’t Care]. 
 176. See Tim Bryan, St. Louisan Could Get 30 Years for Killing Man Who Spread HIV, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1999.  It was later determined that McGee was killed in a robbery 
unrelated to his alleged HIV crimes. 
 177. Some HIV Carriers Don’t Care, supra note 175, at B1. 
 178. See William C. Lhotka, HIV Carrier Infected 3 Women, Police Say, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 1995, at 3D. 
 179. Bell, supra note 159, at A1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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they were afraid of the defendant or possible retribution.182  For example, two 
of McGee’s victims wanted to testify at first, but then changed their minds out 
of fear of going public.183  To resolve this problem, legislators drafted the new 
law so that a victim’s testimony would not be so crucial.184  If a defendant 
knew that he had HIV, and subsequently tested positive for syphilis or 
gonorrhea, then that is enough to show that he is recklessly having sex and 
placing others at risk.185  A defendant’s reckless actions are much easier to 
prove than the old standard of deliberateness.  Health officials and others, 
however, stress that the victim is still a necessary part of the state’s case 
because it would be virtually impossible to prove that the victim did not 
consent without her testimony.186 
Enforcement 
The DOH has the primary responsibility of testing individuals for HIV, 
educating these people about the current criminal law against transmitting the 
virus and reporting violations to the respective county prosecutor.  Since the 
legislature passed the original HIV-transmission statute, the state has 
developed an innovative method of counseling infected persons and enforcing 
the law.  In the early 1990s, the DOH enacted a program designed to handle 
complaints lodged against individuals with HIV who may have engaged in 
reckless sexual behavior.187  This program, entitled Level II Intervention, 
provides the needed step between routine post-test consultation, termed Level I 
Intervention, and prosecution under Missouri law, termed Level III 
Intervention.188  According to health officials, this program represents an effort 
to balance the responsibility of the state to protect the public health with the 
need to protect individual liberties.189 
The Level II Intervention program identifies probable violators through 
disease surveillance, receives and investigates complaints against individuals 
and follows up with potential violators.190  To carry out these responsibilities, 
the state and local health departments employ health specialists who perform a 
variety of functions.  They assess the potential violator’s understanding of HIV 
infection, they counsel on prevention methods and they refer people to case 
management, peer support groups, substance abuse treatment, and medical and 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Bell, supra note 159, at A1. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Todd F. Baumgartner & William Huber, Level II Intervention for Persons Infected with 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), MO. EPIDEMIOLOGIST, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 1. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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behavior modification therapy.191  Moreover, these health specialists provide 
in-depth discussions of the HIV-transmission statute and explain the 
ramifications of violating it.192 
The DOH will initiate a Level II Intervention on confirmed HIV-infected 
persons who are believed to be continuing to practice behavior consistent with 
the known means of transmission of HIV.193  This Level II Intervention can be 
initiated several different ways.  For example, a person who feels that an 
infected sexual partner has exposed her to HIV may file a personal complaint 
directly with the DOH.194  Complaints will be accepted only from the exposed 
person—no third party complaint will be investigated.195  The DOH will accept 
a personal complaint only if the following information is obtained: name and 
locating information of the person filing the complaint; name and locating 
information of the person the complaint is being filed against; and an actual 
complaint with specific details of the incident.  Complaints may be made by 
phone if the above information is ascertained.196 
A private health care provider can also initiate a Level II Intervention.  A 
physician, nurse or social worker who learns of persistent high-risk behavior 
by a client may report this directly to the DOH.197  Other actions that may 
commence a Level II Intervention include: when a confirmed HIV-positive 
person returns to an STD clinic for treatment for a sexually transmitted 
disease; when a person attempts to donate blood or other tissue knowing that 
he is HIV infected; or when a health care coordinator, or case manager, 
identifies persistent high-risk behavior.198 
Level II Interventions are conducted exclusively by trained health 
specialists, who discuss many different issues with the HIV-positive 
individual.  These specialists, for instance, explain the paths of HIV 
transmission and assess the client’s knowledge of these modes.199  They 
suggest proper use of condoms and appropriate medical care.  These specialists 
also emphasize the need to notify future sex or needle-sharing partners of HIV 
status, the need to abstain from donating or selling blood, plasma, body organs, 
tissue or sperm, the need to avoid pregnancy and the need to enroll in a family 
planning program.200 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Baumgartner & Huber, supra note 187, at 1. 
 193. Id. at 1-2. 
 194. Id. at 2. 
 195. Id. 
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They also take considerable time to discuss the consequences of failing to 
modify behavior, thereby exposing another person and creating the potential 
for prosecution.201  To better explain the law, the HIV-positive client is given a 
handout that summarizes the statute referring to non-compliant behavior.202  
This handout outlines the implications and penalties for failure to comply with 
the law.  Afterwards, the client is asked to sign a verification form 
acknowledging his HIV status.203  In this document, the client admits all of the 
following: being advised, orally and in writing, of the necessary precautions to 
prevent the transmission of the virus to others; receiving a copy of the criminal 
transmission statute; and understanding the consequences of violating the 
law.204 
According to a health official, there is no maximum number of times that a 
client can be subjected to a Level II Intervention.205  The ultimate goal of this 
step is behavior modification.206  If it appears that the client is failing to change 
his behavior, the case is sent to a review board to consider the need for 
criminal prosecution.207  This is a Level III Intervention.  The DOH will 
document all evidence of a client’s failure to modify his behavior as outlined in 
the Level II Intervention process.  This evidence is examined on a case-by-case 
basis by the DOH epidemiological and legal staff, and it is shared with 
representatives of the local health department, each of whom will make 
recommendations regarding the filing of the complaint and working with the 
prosecutor.208 
The complaint may be filed jointly by the DOH and the local health 
jurisdiction.209  Alternatively, with the change in the law, a law enforcement 
agency, victim or other person or group may file a complaint directly with the 
prosecutor.  In this situation, per Missouri statute, the DOH is now required to 
assist the prosecutor in developing and preparing the case.210  The DOH has to 
turn over all documented evidence of the alleged crime to assist the 
prosecution’s case. 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Baumgartner & Huber, supra note 187, at 2. 
 203. Missouri Dept. of Health, Second Level Intervention Program, Intervention Verification 
Form (on file with author). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Interview with Debbie Schindler, St. Louis City Health Department, in St. Louis, Mo. 
(Dec. 7, 1999). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Baumgartner & Huber, supra note 187, at 2. 
 209. Interview with Debbie Schindler, supra note 205. 
 210. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677.4 (noting that “[t]he department of health shall assist the 
prosecutor in preparing such case”). 
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V. CRITICISMS OF MISSOURI’S STATUTE 
While the revised Missouri statute makes the law more enforceable from a 
criminal justice perspective, it still contains some controversial aspects.  Some 
of these criticisms are, for example, that the law dissuades individuals from 
getting tested for HIV, in direct contradiction to public policy, and that it 
disproportionately affects homosexual men and other minority groups.  Other 
criticisms include: the law is facially overbroad and vague in violation of the 
First Amendment; its statute of limitation is not long enough to ascertain the 
requisite information to establish a probable cause; its statutory range of 
punishment is too lenient for the crime; and its disclosure requirement 
infringes upon a person’s right to privacy. 
A. The Application of the Law 
Several criticisms of Missouri’s HIV-specific statute involve its 
application to people accused of risky behavior.  First, the statute requires a 
person to know of his HIV-positive status before the state can commence 
criminal charges against him.211  This prerequisite may encourage people to 
forego testing in order to remain ignorant of their HIV status.212  In essence, 
this avoids the “knowing state of mind” requirement.  Since this is a required 
element of the offense, individuals could refuse to get tested for HIV simply to 
prevent being prosecuted.  And since the state wants its citizens to get tested 
for HIV, this is at direct odds with public policy.  This effect, however, may be 
reduced by continued efforts by the DOH to encourage testing by infected 
persons so they may have early access to available drug therapies and 
treatment.213  HIV-positive individuals will not have available medical 
treatment if they refuse to get tested and remain unaware of their viral status.214  
In addition, there is no conclusive proof that fewer people are getting tested in 
Missouri.  In St. Louis, for example, the percentage of persons eligible for HIV 
testing who actually get tested has remained relatively consistent.215 
Moreover, it may be difficult to prove that the defendant had knowledge of 
his HIV status because he may have been tested anonymously or not tested at 
all.216  The prosecutor may have a difficult time discovering sufficient 
evidence to present to a jury.  This criticism may be countered by the activities 
of the DOH and the Level II Intervention program.  This program counsels 
known HIV-infected persons and informs them of the ramifications of their 
 
 211. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677.1. 
 212. Markus, supra note 38, at 873. 
 213. Decker, supra note 38, at 359.  See also Closen, supra note 38, at 48-49. 
 214. Markus, supra note 38, at 873. 
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actions.  It also stresses behavior modification.  The DOH records the names of 
HIV-infected persons and solicits the names of their sexual partners.  More 
importantly, if a complaint is made by a victim, the DOH has the ability to 
cross-reference its lists and narrow down the suspected offenders.217 
Finally, Missouri’s HIV-specific statute could be used discriminatorily 
against politically disfavored groups like gay men and other minorities.218  
This is especially true since homosexual sex acts account for seventy-two 
percent of all HIV transmission cases in Missouri.219  There may be a real 
danger of selective enforcement of this law.  But the possibility of arbitrary 
and abusive enforcement may be curtailed by the DOH.  In light of the DOH’s 
considerable involvement in applying this law, police departments and county 
prosecutors have less discretionary power to selectively enforce the statute.  
Moreover, since the law now provides the defense of informed consent, it 
should not be used disproportionately against homosexuals, especially if they 
inform their sexual partners of their HIV-status.220 
B. First Amendment Challenges 
Another criticism of the Missouri HIV-specific statute involves its 
constitutional validity.  The original law has been judicially challenged on First 
Amendment grounds for allegedly being unconstitutionally overbroad and void 
for vagueness.221  The overbreadth doctrine serves to invalidate a statute that is 
so sweeping that it restricts constitutionally protected rights of speech.222  It 
requires that a law be invalidated if it is fairly capable of being applied to 
punish people for constitutionally protected speech or conduct.223  The test to 
determine if a law is facially overbroad is whether it specifically aims “at evils 
within the allowable area of government control” without sweeping “within its 
ambit other activities that constitute an exercise of protected expressive or 
associational rights.”224  A challenge can be made to the statute only when the 
protected activity is a significant part of the law’s target, and there exists no 
satisfactory way of severing the law’s constitutional applications from those 
that are unconstitutional.225 
 
 217. Interview with Debbie Schindler, supra note 205. 
 218. Markus, supra note 38, at 873-84. 
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The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a statute give fair and 
adequate notice of prohibited conduct to an ordinary person.226  The U.S. 
Supreme Court noted that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.  All are entitled to 
what the State commands or forbids.”227  The law must accordingly provide 
definite standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement—it cannot be applied on an ad hoc or subjective basis.228  The test 
to determine if a law is void for vagueness is whether the statutory language 
conveys to a person of average intelligence a sufficiently unambiguous 
warning when measured by common understanding and practice.229  A 
common person must have sufficient warning of the proscribed conduct. 
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed both of these arguments in 
companion cases.230  In these cases, the defendants were previously diagnosed 
as HIV-positive and received Level II Intervention counseling.231  Both 
defendants were made aware of the criminal statute against transmitting the 
virus, and both acknowledged their understanding of the law and the need to 
inform potential sexual partners of the their HIV-status.232  Irrespective of 
these warnings, the defendants had sexual intercourse without first notifying 
their partners of their HIV status.233 
Defendants first raised a facial overbreadth challenge to the HIV-specific 
statute with which they were charged.  They argued that the law was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes certain conduct that they 
claimed was constitutionally protected.234  The court easily rejected this 
argument because neither defendant raised a direct First Amendment claim in 
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 231. Id. at 309-10. 
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his appeal.235  A First Amendment facial overbreadth challenge is concerned 
only with the rights of free speech and expression.236  Defendants even 
conceded that their actions did not fall into any constitutionally protected 
category.237  The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate 
how the statute prohibits or chills any activity protected by the First 
Amendment.238  Therefore, the court concluded that neither defendant had 
standing to bring a defense under the overbreadth doctrine.239 
One of the defendants also challenged the law as void for vagueness.240  
The defendant argued that the phrase “grave and unjustifiable risk” does not 
provide fair notice of prohibited conduct, and it does not provide standards to 
law enforcement officers to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.241  Rejecting this argument, the court held that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case.242  The defendant 
was placed on notice of what acts were prohibited.243  For example, the 
defendant lied to his partner about being HIV-positive and engaged in 
unprotected anal intercourse, after a health specialist explained to him that anal 
sex was one of the riskiest types of sexual behavior.244 
Moreover, he underwent a lengthy Level II Intervention session.245  At the 
conclusion of the session, he signed a verification form acknowledging that he 
was HIV-positive and confirming his understanding of the law.246  He also 
recognized activities that would place others at risk for exposure.247  In sum, 
the court held that the facts left no doubt that the defendant subjected his 
partner to a “grave and unjustified risk” of behavior.248  In light of these cases, 
it appears that Missouri’s HIV-specific statute will survive a constitutional 
challenge based on First Amendment grounds. 
C. Statute of Limitation and Punishment 
A particularly valid criticism of Missouri’s HIV-specific statute involves 
the statutory period of limitation within which a prosecutor may charge a 
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person for transmitting the virus.  A statute of limitation sets forth a maximum 
time period within which a cause of action may be brought against a 
defendant.249  In criminal law, a statute of limitation is considered “an act of 
grace, a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute.”250  The U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that statutes of limitations provide “the primary 
guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.”251  After the period 
of time set out in a statute of limitation has expired, the state cannot bring any 
legal action against the person for the alleged offense, irrespective of whether 
any claim ever existed.252 
There are several public policy reasons regarding the government’s 
relinquishment of its right to prosecute.  One reason involves the policy of not 
prosecuting persons who have served as law-abiding citizens for some years.253  
Another reason is the diminished public response for retribution and 
accountability.254  But the foremost explanation stresses the desirability of 
requiring a prosecution be based on reasonably fresh evidence to reduce the 
possibility of erroneous conviction.255  Staleness of evidence is certainly a 
relevant issue; it is more difficult for a person to defend himself against 
charges when evidence has been obscured by the passage of time.256  
Moreover, statutes of limitations encourage law enforcement to conduct 
prompt investigations of alleged criminal activity.257 
When proscribing an appropriate statute of limitation, all jurisdictions 
make a distinction between minor and serious criminal offenses.258  More 
serious and violent crimes normally have a lengthier limitations period because 
persons who commit these crimes pose a greater danger to society and are less 
likely to reform their behavior.259  In addition, there is a greater and constant 
need for deterring these types of offenses.260  According to Missouri law, the 
statute of limitations for commencing most felony prosecutions is three 
years.261  Therefore, a prosecutor has to initiate a criminal charge against the 
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defendant within a three-year period after the act was committed.  On the other 
hand, a murder indictment—a class A felony—may be commenced at any 
time.262  The law does not subject prosecutors to any temporal restriction for 
these crimes.  The legislature has selectively defined the serious and violent 
offenses that have no statute of limitation.263 
To determine when the limitation period begins to run, the court inquires 
into when the offense was committed.  Like most jurisdictions, Missouri law 
states that an offense is committed either when every prima facie element of 
the crime has taken place or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing 
course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or 
the defendant’s complicity terminates.264  Time starts to run on the day after 
the offense is committed.265  Missouri law also notes that a prosecution is 
commenced either when an indictment is found or an information is filed.266  It 
does not depend on when the defendant has his day in court. 
The legislature has also enumerated circumstances when the statute of 
limitation does not run.  These tolling exceptions include: (1) any time when 
the accused is absent from the state, but this time cannot extend the period of 
limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years; (2) any time when 
the accused is concealing himself from justice either inside or outside of 
Missouri; (3) any time when a prosecution against the defendant for the 
offense is pending in the state; or (4) any time when the defendant is deemed to 
lack the mental fitness to proceed pursuant to Missouri statute.267  In addition, 
Missouri makes an exception for prosecutions for sexual offenses involving 
persons eighteen years of age and under.268  Under this exception, the time 
period is greatly extended—prosecution for unlawful sexual offenses may be 
commenced within ten years after the victim reaches the age of eighteen.269 
Missouri’s HIV-specific statute has only a three-year statute of limitations.  
This period may be unreasonably restrictive in light of the complexity of 
establishing the prima facie elements of the crime of transmitting the virus.  
 
 262. Id. § 556.036.1. 
 263. Missouri law designates the following crimes as class A felonies: murder in the first 
degree, MO. REV. STAT § 565.020 (1999); murder in the second degree, id. § 565.021 (1999); 
robbery in the first degree, id. § 569.020 (1999); assault in the first degree, id. § 565.050 (1999); 
kidnapping, id. § 565.110 (1999); treason, id. § 575.070 (1995); and trafficking drugs in the first 
degree, id. § 195.222 (1996 & Supp. 2001).  The following crimes could be class A felonies: 
perjury, MO. REV. STAT. § 575.040 (1995); escape or attempted escape from custody, id. § 
575.200 (1995); escape or attempted escape from confinement, id. § 575.210 (1995 & Supp. 
2001) and arson in the first degree, id. § 569.040 (1999). 
 264. MO. REV. STAT. § 556.036.4. 
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For example, the victim may not know that the defendant is indeed HIV-
positive.  The defendant may often deny to the victim that he has been infected 
with the virus.  The only way in which the victim will discover the truth is if 
either the defendant later admits it or the victim is diagnosed with HIV.  It 
could take several years simply to determine the HIV status of the defendant.  
If the victim becomes infected with HIV, the DOH will assist in ascertaining 
how the victim received the virus.270  This may also become a long and 
exhaustive process, especially if the victim had many sexual partners in the 
past.  The DOH may have to interview and test dozens of people if none of the 
sexual partners listed by the victim is known by the DOH to be HIV-positive.  
Again, this investigation could take a significant amount of time to complete. 
While a DOH investigation could take some time to determine if a victim’s 
partners are HIV-positive, it may take even longer to determine if they are 
epidemiologically linked.271  Given that HIV is more prevalent among high-
risk groups, a partner’s HIV-positive status alone would not necessarily mean 
that the defendant infected the partner.  “Viral typing is the only way to 
establish this, and it could add considerable length to an investigation.”272  
Viral typing involves examining the relationship between the DNA of the HIV 
viruses of the victim and defendant.  It is often difficult to establish evidence of 
a direct transmission because a virus mutates or alters its DNA with the 
transmission of HIV from person to person.273 
Moreover, the DOH’s Level II Intervention program may serve as an 
impediment for prosecutors because the program is designed primarily to 
encourage behavior modification.  It is not initiated to recommend immediate 
prosecution of a person suspected of risky sexual behavior.  Unless the victim 
files a personal complaint, the DOH simply investigates whether known HIV-
positive persons are obeying the law.  It will take time for the DOH to track 
down their client’s known sexual partners and determine whether the client 
violated Missouri’s HIV-transmission statute.  The most common way to 
ascertain a client’s partners is simply by asking him, and the client may often 
refuse to provide names or may not be truthful.274  And even if the DOH 
receives factual information, it must locate the victim, ask about the victim’s 
private and intimate sexual relationship with the client and then convince the 
victim to pursue criminal prosecution.275  This is a lengthy and bureaucratic 
process. 
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In light of many of these challenges, a three-year statute of limitations may 
be too short a period of time to discover the necessary evidence to prosecute 
successfully.  In the Stewart case, for example, it took four years for physicians 
even to diagnosis the boy with HIV and an additional two years for 
investigators to gather the evidence that would be used to convict the 
defendant.276  Moreover, the public policy of deterring serious crimes may not 
be advanced by the three-year statute of limitations.  In the McGee example, 
the defendant had sexual relations with possibly over 100 women.277  He was 
clearly a serious threat to the community. 
In addition, the punishment for violating Missouri’s HIV-specific statute 
may be viewed as insufficient.  Many theories have been advanced as to the 
purpose of punishing criminal behavior.  For example, the aim of punishment 
is to prevent the criminal from committing future crimes, to restrain criminals 
from harming society, to rehabilitate convicted criminals so they can return to 
society as reformed citizens, to deter others from committing the crime, to 
educate the public as to what is acceptable behavior and to seek retribution for 
a wronged act.278 
Under Missouri’s criminal code, violating a class C felony is punishable by 
a term of years not to exceed seven years.279  For a class D felony, the term of 
years shall not exceed five years.280  Violating Missouri’s HIV-specific statute 
is only a class D felony.  But if the victim is under the age of seventeen and the 
defendant is over the age of twenty-one, the punishment is a class C felony.  
For many victims, especially those who have acquired HIV from their sexual 
partners, this term of imprisonment is entirely too lenient for the crime.281  
Many of these victims now face a life of frequent hospital visits, daily 
medications, personal embarrassment, social stigma and public 
misunderstanding.  Recognizing that there is no known cure for the disease, the 
victims who are HIV-positive, in a sense, receive a death sentence. 
Those defendants convicted under this statute face only a few years of jail 
time.  Considering the rapidly overcrowding in prisons and the reputation of 
some lenient judges, some defendants could get sentenced to much less time 
and then be placed on probation.  Victims point to other crimes that the 
Missouri legislature has designated as class D felonies, such as passing a bad 
check for over $150 or drawing upon a closed or nonexistent account.282  In 
their minds, this is equating risking the transmission of HIV to writing a bad 
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check for a television.  Not surprisingly, victims feel the punishment for 
violating the statute trivializes the crime and simply does not make sense. 
D. Right to Privacy 
A final and compelling criticism of Missouri’s HIV-specific statute 
involves a person’s right to privacy.  This includes the right to be left alone, the 
right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity and the right to 
live without unwarranted interference by the public.283  First recognized by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,284 the right to personal 
privacy has “permeated American jurisprudence.”285  While the right to 
privacy is not found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court 
found that the Bill of Rights inherently encompasses “zones of privacy.”286  
These zones protect people from unwarranted governmental intrusions.287  But 
since 1973, in cases subsequent to Roe v. Wade,288 the Court has struggled to 
define the parameters of the right to privacy and has been reluctant to extend 
it.289 
The right to privacy encompasses various rights recognized to be inherent 
in the concept of ordered liberty, and such a right prevents governmental 
interference in intimate personal relationships or activities.290  Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, citizens enjoy two types of privacy interests.291  “One 
is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain important kinds of 
decisions.”292  The Court has noted that the right to privacy, however, is not 
absolute and exists only so far as it is consistent with law or public policy.293 
Missouri’s law may unnecessarily abridge a person’s right to privacy 
because test results are revealed to prosecutors and ultimately, the public.  
Once criminal charges have been issued, the charges are a matter of public 
record, and the accused may discover that his HIV-positive status is widely 
known.  Enforcement of the statute may impede efforts to preserve the 
confidentiality of medical records and may “undermine the assurances of 
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public health officials that HIV test results will remain confidential.”294  In 
addition, if individual privacy rights are systematically disregarded by the 
nonconsensual disclosure of medical records in efforts to reduce HIV 
transmission, more people will avoid testing. 
The report of the Presidential Commission stressed that “HIV criminal 
statutes should include strong, uniform confidentiality protection.”295  The 
DOH is placed in an uncomfortable position.  On the one hand, it has an ethical 
obligation to keep its clients records confidential.  It has to develop and nurture 
the trust of HIV-positive persons and make them comfortable in seeking 
medical assistance.  The DOH cannot be viewed as extended branch of the 
criminal justice community.  But on the other hand, it has an overriding 
obligation to protect the public against the spread of HIV. 
To protect these records, the Missouri General Assembly enacted a statute 
protecting the confidentiality of reports and records.296  This law demands that 
information and records in any government agency, department or political 
subdivision concerning the HIV-status of a person be kept strictly confidential 
and shall not be disclosed.297  But this law may seem ineffective because of its 
exceptions.  For example, the law states that no person is liable for violating 
any duty or right of confidentiality for disclosing the results of another’s HIV 
testing to the DOH or to health care personnel working with the infected 
person, unless the person acted in bad faith or conscious disregard.298  This 
may serve as a way of circumventing the right to privacy and the 
confidentiality of medical records.  For once the DOH discovers a person’s 
HIV-positive status, that person could later be subjected to criminal 
prosecution. 
The Missouri Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of a right to 
privacy in HIV-transmission cases.299  In State v. Mahan, defendants alleged 
that the trial courts erred in permitting the prosecution to present evidence to 
the jury that they were HIV-positive.300  They argued that by subpoenaing and 
revealing their HIV test results to the jury, the prosecutors violated their 
medical privilege of confidentiality.301  The court, however, held that the 
defendants overlooked other statutes that permitted the results of HIV tests to 
be disclosed to public employees outside the DOH, who need to know the 
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individual’s status in order to “perform their public duties.”302  In this case, the 
prosecutor needed to know the individual’s HIV status to charge him for 
violating the statute. 
Because infection with HIV is an element of the crime of risking infection 
with HIV, a prosecutor who is contemplating bringing charges against 
someone under this statute needs to know the HIV status of that person.303  
Moreover, section four of the statute anticipates that the HIV test results of an 
individual may be shared with prosecutors and used in the preparation of the 
state’s case against the individual.304  In enacting this language, the legislature 
acknowledged that one of the enumerated exceptions to the HIV 
confidentiality statute must apply to prosecutors, judges and jurors in 
defendants’ cases.305  According to the court, the social interests in protecting a 
sexual partner from HIV infection must outweigh an individual’s right to 
privacy.306 
Legislators also recently enacted a law giving the Missouri State Attorney 
General’s office and county prosecutors the power to obtain HIV-related 
medical records from the DOH if there is a compelling reason.307  To receive 
these documents, a court order is all that is required.308  The measure was 
drafted as an outgrowth of the Stewart case where the prosecutor encountered 
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many obstacles trying to receive information from the DOH.309  These records, 
however, cannot be disclosed to the victim or anyone else.  This law may serve 
as another example of the lessening right to privacy.  On the other hand, those 
in the criminal justice system maintain that this is a necessary tool to 
effectively prosecute persons who recklessly expose others to HIV. 
VI. ILLINOIS’ HIV-SPECIFIC STATUTE 
Illinois also has enacted an HIV-specific criminal statute,310 which clearly 
sets out specific HIV-transmitting behaviors that are prohibited.  This law 
places individuals on notice and resolves any void for vagueness challenge.  
For example, the transfer or donation of blood, tissue, semen or organs for 
almost any purpose is strictly prohibited.311  In addition, the statute disallows 
the delivery, exchange, transfer or sale of nonsterile intravenous or 
intramuscular drug paraphernalia.312  This paraphernalia is well defined as any 
equipment, product or material of any kind, which is peculiar to and marketed 
for use in injecting a substance into the human body.313 
Illinois’ statute does not require the element of intent to harm others by 
infecting them with HIV.  The Illinois legislature drafted around the knowing 
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state of mind requirement inherent in traditional criminal offenses.  The statute 
simply prohibits HIV-positive persons from engaging in intimate contact with 
another.314  Prosecutions will be easier to achieve absent the intent provision, 
and convictions will be more likely under this statute, which will increase the 
effect of deterrence.  It is only necessary to prove that a defendant knew of his 
HIV-positive status and engaged in intimate conduct.315  The Illinois law also 
enumerates an affirmative defense of informed consent.316  The statute declares 
that “it shall be an affirmative defense that the person exposed knew that the 
infected person was infected with HIV, knew that the action could result in 
infection with HIV, and consented to the action with that knowledge.”317  In 
this provision, the statute recognizes the right to privacy between two 
consenting adults and their right to engage in personal, sexual acts absent the 
intrusion of government. 
In addition, the statute maintains that infection need not occur in order for 
an individual to be charged with violating the statute.  The law punishes only 
the risky behavior and not the consequences of such acts.  This alleviates the 
causation problems that plague traditional criminal laws.318  The prosecution 
does not need to prove that the defendant was the cause of the victim’s 
infection.319  The Illinois statute is also limited in scope—it applies only to 
those who know of their HIV-positive status and continue to engage in risky 
behavior.  This protects those individuals who are unknowingly HIV-infected 
and unwittingly pass on the virus. 
Illinois’ statute contains some of the same weaknesses as the Missouri 
HIV-specific statute.  The most significant criticism involves the definition of 
intimate contact and whether it violates the void for vagueness doctrine.  
Specifically, the statute defines intimate contact as “the exposure of the body 
of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result 
in the transmission of HIV.”320  The question then rests on what could result in 
the transmission of the virus from one individual to another.  Biting, spitting or 
throwing infected bodily fluids are all behaviors that do not seem to fall within 
the prohibited conduct of the law.321  This definition may be overly broad and 
void for vagueness.322  But if this definition is given judicial construction, 
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which limits it to means of transmitting HIV recognized by the CDC, then it 
loses its vagueness and provides adequate notice of prohibited behavior.323 
Moreover, a person who violates the Illinois statute is guilty of a class 2 
felony.  The maximum punishment authorized under a class 2 felony is only 
three to seven years imprisonment.324  In addition, like Missouri, the statute of 
limitation for this statute is three years.325  Therefore, the Illinois HIV-specific 
statute suffers the same criticisms as Missouri when regarding punishment and 
the statute of limitation. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although new disease-fighting medications are becoming available, AIDS 
continues to take the lives of thousands of Americans.  Everyone who 
possesses the disease is in some way a hostage.  These victims have to endure 
the fear, social discrimination and daily challenges of living with AIDS.  At the 
same time, however, HIV-positive individuals have a unique responsibility to 
society—for they possess a deadly weapon in their blood stream.  While public 
education should encourage HIV-testing, safe sex and clean needle exchanges, 
education alone is not the most effective method of preventing the disease.  
HIV-specific statutes clearly advance the objective of deterring risky sexual 
behavior. 
The Missouri General Assembly did an admirable job at addressing this 
problem.  The legislators crafted a criminal statute that prohibits people from 
reckless exposing others to the deadly virus.  Since the original law was 
difficult to prosecute, they lessened the required mental element of culpability 
for the crime from intentional or knowing to reckless.  The legislators also 
enumerated specific acts that are considered evidence of reckless behavior, and 
they expanded the groups of people who can file complaints with the 
prosecutor.  This list notably includes victims and local law enforcement 
agencies.  Finally, they enacted a statute that allows prosecutors to obtain 
medical records if the court finds a compelling reason.  This is a much needed 
tool to better facilitate the prosecution of individuals suspected of transmitting 
HIV. 
But even though the amended HIV-specific statute corrected many of the 
deficiencies of the original HIV-specific statute, additional revisions could be 
implemented.  One recommendation, for example, advocated by health 
specialists, involves explicitly carving out an affirmative defense of informed 
consent, as in the Illinois statute.  Missouri’s law states that a person may be 
charged with exposing another to HIV “without the knowledge and consent of 
that person to be exposed to HIV.”  While it is assumed that Missouri’s new 
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statute creates the affirmative defense of informed consent, Illinois’ approach 
is more direct and simpler to understand.  During Level II Interventions, for 
instance, health specialists could point to the unambiguous sentence in the 
statute explaining the meaning of informed consent. 
Another recommendation involves the DOH Level II Intervention program 
of enforcement.  This successful program balances the privacy rights of an 
HIV-positive individual with the need to protect the public.  While this 
program principally aims at behavior modification, there is simply no 
maximum number of times a person can be subjected to a Level II session 
before his name is suggested for criminal prosecution.  Therefore, a potential 
offender may engage in risky behavior dozens of times before the DOH will 
recommend his name to the county prosecutor. 
By serving as counselor to its clients and as liaison to prosecutors, the 
DOH is undoubtedly placed in an uncomfortable situation.  It needs to develop 
trust and rapport with its clients without undermining its assurances that a 
client’s medical records will remain confidential.  Though recognizing this 
dilemma, the DOH should promulgate some stricter guidelines that would 
make the process more efficient and less bureaucratic.  For example, it could 
implement a general policy as to the number of times an individual can 
undergo a Level II Intervention.  By forwarding more swiftly to prosecutors 
the names of known violators, the number of convictions would increase, the 
deterrence effect would be heightened and the citizens of the state would be 
better protected. 
Finally, Missouri’s law needs a longer statute of limitation and a more 
appropriate punishment.  A three-year statute of limitation is clearly not 
enough time for the DOH to thoroughly investigate the matter.  It may take 
years to track down an individual’s sexual partners and determine whether they 
are HIV-positive and epidemiologically linked.  Moreover, a longer statutory 
period also advances the public policy underlying statutes of limitations.  
Freshness of evidence is not an overriding concern when an HIV-infected 
person is trying to track down who gave her the deadly disease.  A person’s 
HIV-positive status is something that will not change.  The questions that need 
only be addressed include whether the person had sexual relations with the 
victim, knew his HIV status and adequately informed his partner.  Moreover, 
as the McGee example amply demonstrates, individuals who risk transmitting 
the virus pose a significant risk to society.  It is in the state’s interest to 
lengthen the statute of limitation for this crime. 
It also seems appropriate to increase the degree of punishment for violating 
this statute.  The legislatures of Arkansas, Indiana and North Dakota, for 
example, classify their HIV-specific statutes as class A felonies.326  One 
suggestion may include an enhanced sentencing option if the victim acquired 
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HIV as a result of the encounter.  If the victim did receive the virus, then a 
greater range of punishment should be available to the courts.  Indiana 
specifically carves out a greater punishment if the virus is transferred to the 
victim.327  If Missouri were to follow this approach, then exposing another 
person would ordinarily be a class D felony with a three-year statute of 
limitation.  Transferring the virus, on the other hand, would be a class A felony 
with no statute of limitation.  This would effectively circumvent the problem in 
determining who actually infected the victim with HIV.  The current 
punishment of five years simply does not appear to be a sufficient punishment 
for this crime.  The judge in the Stewart case certainly did not think that a life 
sentence with possibility of parole in fifteen years was enough. 
By taking into consideration the criticisms of the statute and the available 
remedies, the Missouri legislature should be able to make an informed decision 
as to how to ameliorate these problems by amending the existing law.  
Prosecutors should be able to successfully prosecute offenders under 
Missouri’s HIV-specific statute in lieu of one of the traditional criminal 
statutes.  The statutory deficiencies inherent in this law need to be addressed to 
protect innocent victims like the child in the Stewart case.  The active 
enforcement of this statute is a fundamental step in the fight to stop the spread 
of this deadly disease. 
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